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ORGANS MISUSED AND USED: A COMMENT ON THE SOLE 
ORGAN PROBLEM 
MARTIN S. FLAHERTY* 
INTRODUCTION 
Michael Van Altsine’s article, Taking Care of John Marshall’s Political 
Ghost, makes use of a classic historical convention to mount a devastating 
critique on a hoary legal myth.1  The myth holds that the President, as the “sole 
organ” of foreign affairs, exercises something approaching all power over U.S. 
international relations unless the Constitution specifies otherwise, and 
sometimes even if it does.2  The myth further holds that not only presidents 
have taken this position, but that it was pioneered by none other than John 
Marshall.3  This myth made its appearance, as most legal myths do, in a 
Supreme Court opinion; here Justice Sutherland’s justly criticized effort in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.4  As Van Alstine well 
documents, it had made certain appearances before, and has been more or less 
constantly on stage since.5  Like most myths, the “sole organ” statement is not 
without some basis in fact.  Yet like many myths, especially legal myths, it 
shrinks almost beyond recognition when subjected to genuine historical 
scrutiny. 
Van Alstine conducts his analysis using a device that is immediately 
recognizable to anyone familiar with rigorous historical scholarship.  This 
trope consists of first, taking a familiar historical incident or figure, and next, 
tracing how it has changed—sometimes radically—through time, usually 
because of contemporary reasons and context.  Consider an example I recall 
from one of my first seminars in graduate school.  There, fledgling historians 
 
* Leitner Family Professor of International Human Rights Law, Fordham Law School; Visiting 
Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. 
 1. Michael P. Van Alstine, Taking Care of John Marshall’s Political Ghost, 53 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 93 (2008). 
 2. See id. at 99–104 (citing 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall 
on Mar. 7, 1800)). 
 3. See id. at 93. 
 4. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (citing 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. 
Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800)). 
 5. Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 99–104, 99 n.104. 
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encountered the familiar story of Tituba, one of the first women accused during 
the Salem witch trials.6  As one historian has noted, Tituba’s race came to be 
seen as African, after having been half-African, Indian, and half-Indian.7  
These changes, moreover, had less to do with any attempt to discover her real 
origins than to fulfill the needs of changing racial stereotyping.8  Professor Van 
Alstine gravitates to this technique for obvious reasons.  The frequent 
repetition of the “sole organ” line by presidentialists, whether Democratic or 
Republican, whether in the Executive, Judicial, or even Legislative Branches,9 
suggests a myth that expanded to fit later needs rather than one that emerged 
full-blown.  The challenge, therefore, is trying to recover what Marshall’s 
“sole organ” statement meant in the first place. 
Van Alstine meets this challenge elegantly.  This warm assessment arises 
largely because his effort accords with a fair deal of historical work I have 
done regarding legal and historical scholarship,10 including on U.S. foreign 
relations law.11  Saying this, however, raises the danger of appearing 
solipsistic.  To avoid that charge, I will focus not on my work, but rather on 
how Van Alstine’s work confirms my work. 
Toward that end I want to raise two further, and corollary, points for 
balance in this short critique.  One is, and in fact this is where—I am sad to 
say—he echoes my work best: Van Alstine is very good on the “misuse” part 
of the “Use and Misuse of History in Foreign Relations Law.”  Here, my only 
criticism is he might have taken things a little further, but it is a relatively 
minor criticism.  The other point, the more critical one—and this is a self-
criticism as much as it is a criticism of Van Alstine’s article—concerns the 
“use” part.  How should we, especially we constitutional lawyers, use a proper 
account of the “sole organ” statement in light of its subsequent misuse?  More 
generally, what do we do with this kind of episode in American history?  These 
questions cut to the heart of these papers and this symposium. 
I.  MISUSE 
Consider first the misuse.  At the outset, I note that Van Alstine’s article 
engages in certain methodological approaches, all of which I think are 
 
 6. See Chadwick Hansen, The Metamorphosis of Tituba, or Why American Intellectuals 
Can’t Tell an Indian Witch from a Negro, 47 NEW ENG. Q. 3, 3 (1974). 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. at 11–12. 
 9. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 99–104. 
 10. See Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995). 
 11. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2004); Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, 
Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 
(1999) [hereinafter History Right?]. 
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exemplary.  As such, they are the polar opposite of law office history or what 
some have called history “lite.”12 
One method that lawyers often employ with phrases or legal texts is to try 
to figure out what they mean, starting from the specific and moving to the 
general.13  What historians do, by contrast, is to start with general context and 
then try to figure out more specific issues and the meaning of those specific 
issues.  Van Alstine does that very well in showing first the lawyerly approach 
and then secondly the historical approach.  He first gives the conventional 
lawyerly interpretation of the “sole organ” phrase, giving a bare bones account 
of it and then explaining how it has been used.14  In this he echoes the 
transformation of Tituba.  But then the study takes a few steps back and builds 
the larger political context and legal context in which the speech was given.15  
This essential tack enables Van Alstine to recapture the original significance 
and meaning of Marshall’s actual speech. 
A second methodological point Van Alstine follows is engagement with 
the secondary literature.16  And here, especially when it comes to rebuilding 
the context, he looks at many of the relevant major works concerning the 
stakes involved with the election of 1800 and the politicization between the 
Federalists, the High Federalists, and the Jeffersonians.17  From this he rightly 
discerns how great the incentives were for Marshall to soft-pedal presidential 
power and to keep it narrow in his defense of what Adams did in this highly 
charged episode.18  All of that said, one thing I would have liked to have seen 
more of was direct engagement with other previous work on the topic, 
especially with that of Ruth Wedgwood, insofar as she has advanced an 
alternative view in a prominent article published in a prominent law journal.19 
Finally, and it is ironic for someone who at least has some history training 
to say, but for me one of the last things to look at is primary sources.  This 
ordering follows from the prior imperative to build context first.  Begin by 
looking at what other historians have said, and then you are informed enough 
to make sense of what can otherwise be cryptic and misleading snippets of 
musty texts that can yield emphysema as readily as they yield meaning.  
Primary sources can be misleading unless you have built up larger historical 
legal understandings.20 
 
 12. See Flaherty, supra note 10, at 549–56. 
 13. See id. at 553–54. 
 14. Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 95–104. 
 15. Id. at 104–19. 
 16. See Flaherty, supra note 10, at 553–55. 
 17. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 110–19. 
 18. Id. at 119. 
 19. Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 
229 (1990). 
 20. See Flaherty, supra note 10, at 553–55. 
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Beyond these methodological guidelines, which apply to those engaging in 
originalist, quasi-originalist, historicist, or whatever the term may be for 
recapturing history for foreign relations and constitutional reasons, sometimes 
there will be a dominant narrative.  Such a narrative may be about 
constitutional development in general or about certain episodes.  If a school of 
historical thought emerges on a relevant matter, there is a presumption, 
rebuttable, but a presumption nonetheless, that the interpretation of specific 
historical episodes should in some way comport with the established narrative 
unless one has come up with enough evidence to rebut this presumption.  Too 
often, lawyers make historical assertions with no connection to, or that are 
inconsistent with, a picture that scholars may have painstakingly created over 
the course of a generation.  Sometimes they do so on purely instrumental 
grounds, in order to get to where they want to go.  Sometimes they do so in 
utter good faith, but they simply lack the time, resources, or necessary 
historical background.  Either way, too often lawyers and law professors come 
up with something that would be radically revisionist if it were presented 
before historians.  They do this, moreover, without anywhere near the amount 
of evidence required to make sense of what would otherwise seem an anomaly 
in the larger story.21 
How does all of this cut in favor of Van Alstine?  What I have just 
recounted are rules for credible history by lawyers that I set forth about ten 
years ago in an article entitled History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism.22  Regarding method, yes, Professor Van Alstine is getting 
at the context properly, engaging in the secondary literature ably, and getting 
basic facts from the primary sources down.  He hits the marks on every 
procedural point. 
What of the merits of the story?  Enough about his work; what about mine?  
Here it is a similar story.  One central point that Van Alstine takes as a given is 
that treaties during this period were considered self-executing, or at the very 
least presumptively self-executing.23  Nor is this surprising, given that this was 
the dominant understanding of treaties just over a decade before when the 
Constitution was ratified.24 
Professor John Yoo tried to refute this view on historical grounds.25  In my 
view that attempt was almost laughably wanting, precisely in terms of its use 
of historical sources to further a radically revisionist case.26  Therefore, in 
 
 21. See id. at 554–55. 
 22. Id. at 553–55. 
 23. Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 129–33. 
 24. See History Right?, supra note 11. 
 25. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999). 
 26. See id.; see also History Right?, supra note 11, at 2095–99. 
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another article I sought to adhere to my own historical precepts to refute the 
refutation.27  That effort proved to be fairly straightforward since, in my view, 
it is painfully obvious that the Founding generation thought treaties should be 
self-executing.28  Indeed, one does not need to go much beyond the text of the 
Supremacy Clause to see the point.29  Ironically, the upshot of the Founding 
commitment to treaties as the supreme law of the land now appears lost on the 
Supreme Court.30  Sound historical interpretation remains, however much 
judicial authority or academic eagerness would like to have the facts the other 
way. 
That said, John Marshall’s Political Ghost might have accorded John 
Yoo’s otherwise outlandish assertion some consideration in one regard.  The 
question does arise whether anyone involved in the Robbins controversy that 
Van Alstine describes made any arguments against treaties being self-
executing.  Robbins’s Jeffersonian supporters certainly had the incentive to do 
so, however much self-execution may have seemed settled during the 
Constitution’s ratification.  This query arises given that Founding consensus on 
a provision or doctrine often gives way in light of subsequent politics, which 
can make positions that were off the wall suddenly appear on the table.  It 
would not come as a shock if at least some individuals were making non-self-
execution arguments.  Only twenty years later, after all, Marshall himself 
would author the Court’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson, holding that not all 
treaties were necessarily self-executing.31 
More important and intriguing to me is not a speculative question, but an 
observation regarding what Van Alstine recovers concerning early conceptions 
of executive power and constitutional interpretation more generally.  Striking, 
at least to me, is the text-bound approach that Congressman Marshall follows 
in his famous speech, an approach diametrically opposed to the expansive 
conception of presidential power that the “sole organ” language ostensibly 
supports.  As I read it, his defense of Adams’s actions, which itself is careful 
and modest, tracks two ideas and two constitutional clauses. 
One is his duty as President to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed.32  And one of those laws is the Treaty at issue.  What triggers the 
whole affair is that the British want to extradite Robbins to try and execute him 
pursuant to U.S. treaty obligations.33  That said, Van Alstine perhaps overlooks 
 
 27. See History Right?, supra note 11. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. at 2095, 2151. 
 30. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 31. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 33. Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 96–97 (citing Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, 
U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. XXVII, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116). 
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what triggers this trigger.  Another reason the British might have wanted to 
execute Robbins is, and this is just self-pleading, apparently he may have been 
Irish.34 
The other clause at issue may be less obvious but not less compelling: the 
Receive Ambassadors Clause.35  Now this may not be evident given the text of 
Marshall’s speech. But a little bit of historical research reveals that it was 
common both in England and in the United States during the eighteenth 
century to view the power to receive ambassadors as containing an array of 
related powers to recognize countries—including communication with other 
foreign sovereigns.36  This, I believe, is the ultimate source of Marshall’s “sole 
organ” language, the modest claim that the President is the point person for 
communication with other nations. 
In stark contrast, what it is not is the Executive Vesting Clause, or the 
notion that executive power is foreign affairs power.  That is exactly the 
argument Marshall might be expected to make, but does not.  His failure to do 
so fully comports with another article I have written, this time with Professor 
Curtis Bradley.37  Our article, with mind-deadening detail, states that historical 
sources overwhelmingly demonstrate that the Founding generation saw no 
undifferentiated reservoir of power in the Executive.38  To the contrary, from 
the beginning of the eighteenth century through the Pacificus-Helvidius 
Neutrality Controversy debate, only two people make this general Executive 
Vesting Clause argument.39  One is well-known: Alexander Hamilton, writing 
as Pacificus, but he makes the argument only in passing.40  The other is the 
renowned Egbert Benson, a Congressman from New York, presenting the 
argument during the famous debates on presidential removal of executive 
officers.41  Everyone else argues almost every foreign relations dispute in 
terms of tethering it to specific clauses in the same way that Marshall does 
here.42 
This clause-specific approach may actually cause us to double-back and 
confirm a larger background contextual point.  Especially in foreign affairs, 
this was the dominant mode of interpretation.43  One interesting further inquiry 
would therefore be: Was there evidence to the contrary?  Was there some fire-
 
 34. Id. at 96. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 36. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 664–79 (2004). 
 37. See id. passim. 
 38. See id. at 592–688. 
 39. See id. at 653, 679. 
 40. Id. at 679–83. 
 41. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 36, at 653. 
 42. Id. passim. 
 43. See id. at 686. 
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breathing Federalist or High Federalist, or some Hamiltonian or Hamilton 
himself perhaps who was making the broader argument during this 
controversy?  The apparent negative answer confirms both the larger picture 
and Van Alstine’s work. 
II.  USE 
As for uses, the issue essentially comes down to this: one great use for the 
account Van Alstine reconstructs is to put to rest an annoying sound byte—the 
sole organ myth—which to this day crops up in the Executive’s briefs, 
speeches, and other utterances.44  And at the very least one will be able to use 
this and interject that this particular sound byte, however oft-repeated, simply 
has no basis in fact. 
More generally, one thing that neither I alone nor with Professor Bradley 
have been able to do, is provide more about the positive uses for the history we 
have found. With Van Alstine’s findings in mind, let me very briefly suggest 
three steps forward. 
First, if we are considering some version of the original understanding at 
the time of the Founding, the Van Alstine piece suggests that clause-centered 
interpretation is the way to start.45  Yet with each of these steps comes a 
problem.  In this instance, when is a given text “stretched” too far?  For that, a 
theory of textual interpretation and historical interpretation is needed.  
Recognizing a country under the Receive Ambassadors Clause, for example, 
seems far too broad unless one has researched a bit of the background history.  
Yet there are many more instances where the text, plausibly interpreted, runs 
out, as does the relevant history.  In fact, this happens most of the time.  Think 
of the problems associated with fixing the meaning of the Commerce, Declare 
War, or Executive Vesting Clauses. 
The second step, therefore, becomes turning to supplementary sources 
where text and history fail plausibly to fix constitutional meaning.  Especially 
valuable in foreign relations, not least because there appears to have been some 
expectation, is reliance on evolving custom or tradition.  This is the idea that 
constitutional meaning would be worked out incrementally, over time.  One 
recent advocate of this approach, more or less, is Dean Larry Kramer.46  Yet 
this approach too has its problems.  Necessary in this instance is a theory to 
address at what point custom becomes binding.  Or conversely, when is custom 
a divergence from what is proper and legitimate?  At what point does it 
become what is proper and legitimate?  This is the classic problem with any 
 
 44. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 100–01. 
 45. See id. at 119–35. 
 46. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
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sort of customary tradition-based theory of constitutional interpretation.  This 
is a substantial normative problem. 
Finally, Van Alstine’s work suggests something of an intermediate step.  
While history is, for the most part, very bad at answering specific questions, 
sometimes, in fact, maybe somewhat often, history can be fairly good at 
providing very general abstract commitments from the Founding.  This in fact 
may be a common implication of the contributions to this symposium.  Text 
and history, for example, are not going to reveal much about the removal 
power.  Custom may, but then when are the political branches violating what 
should be legitimate?  When are they not?  When are they merely filling in?  
Yet, I think one thing that can powerfully guide us is knowing that a primary 
purpose of separation of powers was to prevent tyranny, the accretion of too 
much power in any one branch.47  In consequence, if it appears that we have a 
strong and still-growing Executive Branch thanks to the administrative state 
and the press of national security, then it makes sense to allow Congress to 
have restrictions on the removal power, the legislative veto, and a more robust 
role in approving the deployment of armed forces.48 
CONCLUSION 
These updated thoughts reflect on how history is misused, and provide a 
few preliminary musings about how it still might be used nonetheless.  The 
question becomes: How do we begin thinking about how the Founding 
generation was looking at these issues?  And can it be relevant to us later on?  
Michael Van Alstine has provided a wonderful reminder of the persistent 
reality of history’s mistreatment, yet the ongoing possibilities of its 
rehabilitation. 
 
 47. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1741 (1996). 
 48. See id. at 1828–39. 
